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Abstract. This article explains why a proﬁt-maximizing developer may include multiple,
competing outlets in a shopping center. While competing outlets presumably dissipate
potential proﬁts, thereby lowering aggregate rents that the developer can extract, the
presence of shopping externalities causes the developer to be interested not just in
individual store proﬁts, but also in the trafﬁc they generate throughout the center. And
since competition among identical stores increases trafﬁc, it can create an offsetting
advantage that favors multiple outlets. The article provides a theoretical analysis of this
problem and illustrates its implications for tenant mix by applying the theory to the
problem of ﬁlling a vacant store. The paper concludes by explicitly relating the analysis
to Brueckner’s (1993) model of the optimal allocation of space in shopping centers.
Introduction
A nascent literature on the economics of shopping centers has examined the
importance of inter-store externalities, or spillover shopping, on the structure and
composition of centers. The seminal theoretical analysis by Brueckner (1993) focused
on the question of how a developer should allocate space in a center among stores
whose sales are interrelated through this externality.1 According to Brueckner’s
analysis, the developer should allocate space to a particular store until that store’s
marginal revenue from an additional square foot equals the marginal cost of space
minus the marginal increase in sales enjoyed by all other stores due to the spillover
effect. Thus, stores that confer large external beneﬁts on other stores in the center
should receive more space, all else equal.
Another implication of this shopping externality is that a proﬁt-maximizing developer
may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to include multiple outlets of a given type of store in a center.
The data in Exhibit 1, for example, show that for large shopping centers, there are on
average multiple outlets for a wide variety of stores. Standard location theory cannot
explain this observation because a developer controls entry into the center rather than
there being free entry. Combining this with the fact that location in a shopping center
confers some spatial monopoly power on stores suggests that the developer can extract
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Exhibit 1
Number of Outlets per Shopping Center by Store Type: 1995
Tenant Classiﬁcation
Type of Shopping Center
Super-Regional Regional
General merchandise 2.4 0.0
Food 1.6 1.0
Food services 1.3 0.9
Women’s clothing 14.2 8.3
Men’s clothing 4.5 2.2
Shoes 11.7 5.4
Home appliances 1.5 0.9
Music 2.3 1.5
Book stores 2.0 1.4
Jewelry 5.9 3.9
Eyeglass stores 2.2 1.5
Source: Computed from data in The Dollars and Cents of Shopping Centers: 1995, The Urban Land
Institute, Washington, DC.
the highest possible rent from a given type of store by allowing it to exploit fully that
monopoly power. Multiple outlets, however, would presumably dissipate some of the
joint proﬁts, thereby lowering the aggregate rents that the developer could extract.
The shopping externality provides an answer to this puzzle by introducing an
offsetting effect to the developer’s desire to maximize the proﬁt earned by each store
individually (which, as noted, favors one outlet of each type). Speciﬁcally, the
externality causes the developer to be interested not just in an individual store’s proﬁts,
but also in the ‘‘trafﬁc’’ it generates, since more trafﬁc will produce larger spillover
beneﬁts (and hence proﬁts) for other types of stores. Since we know from basic
microeconomic theory that monopolists maximize proﬁts by limiting output (or
trafﬁc), a single outlet earning monopoly proﬁts will minimize the external beneﬁts
for other types of stores. As more outlets enter, however, output will increase due to
the greater competition. The optimal number of outlets therefore balances these two
effects in terms of their impact on developer proﬁts.
The ﬁrst section of this paper develops this argument in greater detail. The analysis
is distinguished from that in Brueckner by focusing on output as the choice variable
for stores, and the number of outlets of a given type as the choice variable for the
developer, while holding space per store ﬁxed. In contrast, Brueckner focused on space
as the only choice variable.2 The emphasis on output seems to be a more natural way
of highlighting the trade-off noted above between inter-store competition versus
complementarity. Further, a store’s choice of output would seem to be a more
fundamental determinant of sales than space. After completing the theoretical analysis,
we illustrate the results with a numerical example of a common problem facing a
shopping center manager: namely, how to ﬁll a vacant store.OPTIMAL COMPETITION AND ALLOCATION OF SPACE IN SHOPPING CENTERS 115
In the next section we take a ﬁrst step towards integrating space and output in the
model by specifying a demand function that says that the price a store can charge is
negatively related to its own output, positively related to the output of other stores
through the shopping externality, and also positively related to the amount of space
allocated to the store. From this demand curve, we derive Brueckner’s sales function,
which depends only on the space allocated to all stores in the center. The analysis
thus serves as a foundation for Brueckner’s basic results regarding the optimal
allocation of space to various types of stores. The ﬁnal section offers concluding
remarks.
Competition versus Complementarity in Output
This section develops a simple model of the optimal number of competing outlets
that a proﬁt-maximizing developer should include in a shopping center characterized
by inter-store shopping externalities. Shopping externalities arise from the spatial
clustering of stores, which allows multi-stop shoppers to economize on transportation
costs. Although downtown shopping districts also offer this advantage, shopping
center developers can exploit it fully (and thereby make a proﬁt) by optimally planning
the selection and physical conﬁguration of stores.3 Clearly, including a variety of
stores in a center is essential for achieving the maximum extent of this beneﬁt.
However, the question we are concerned with in this section is whether it ever makes
sense for a developer to include competing stores, or stores selling the identical
product, in the center.
In order to focus on this question, we assume that competing stores are perfect
substitutes and therefore do not confer external beneﬁts on one another. That is, we
assume that shopping spillovers only occur across stores that are either complements
or imperfect substitutes. Thus, for example, two shoe stores would not be regarded
as competing stores for the purposes of the model if they offered differentiated
products. In fact, adding a second shoe store would likely result in some combination
of spillover beneﬁts and competition if the two stores stocked some identical and
some differentiated products. We abstract somewhat from this case by assuming that
a given type of store sells a single good which is either a perfect substitute or a
differentiated product from an existing store, but not both.
Brueckner’s (1993) analysis of shopping externalities explains why it is optimal for
the developer to include complementary outlets in the center. Our object in this section
is to show that it may also be optimal for a developer to include multiple outlets
selling identical products (e.g., more that one book store), even though there is no
complementarity between them. Thus, while our assumption of single-product stores
selling either perfect substitutes or differentiated products is somewhat unrealistic, if
anything it biases our model away from inclusion of multiple stores selling the same
product.
For now, the model focuses exclusively on store output as the choice variable; the
amount of space allocated to each store is assumed to be ﬁxed. In the next section
we add space as a choice variable.116 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Theoretical Analysis
We consider a very simple model in which a shopping center developer chooses the
optimal number of outlets, n, for a given type of store. As noted, we assume stores
sell a single good that deﬁnes their type. We assume that the shopping center creates
a spatial monopoly for stores of this type, so they face a downward sloping, inverse
demand curve of the form:
P 5 a 2 bQ, (1)
where P is price, Q is aggregate output across the n identical outlets, and a and b are
positive constants.4 (We assume the demand curve is linear for analytical simplicity.)
If we let q be output per outlet, then Q 5 nq. Note that n is constrained to be an
integer greater than or equal to one. Although we will focus below on inter-store
externalities conferred by this type of store on other types of stores in the center, this
store enjoys reciprocal beneﬁts, which we assume are embedded in the parameter a.
(We examine this aspect of the model in detail in the next section.)
We assume that the shopping center developer is able to extract a rent from each store
equal to its expected economic proﬁts.5 The rental lease is set up-front, however, so
in making their output decisions, we assume stores view the rent R as a ﬁxed cost.
Thus, outlet i (i 5 1,...,n; n $ 1) chooses qi to maximize its proﬁt, or net sales:
p 5 Pq 2 cq , (2) ii i
where c is the (constant) variable cost of output.6 Substituting for P from Equation
(1) yields:
p 5 (a 2 bQ)q 2 cq , (3) ii i
It is useful to write aggregate output across the n outlets of this type of store as Q 5
ojÞiqj 1 qi. Substituting this into Equation (3) yields:
p 5 [a 2 b(o q 1 q)]q 2 cq . (39) ij Þij i i i
We assume Cournot-Nash conjectures on the part of stores. That is, each outlet i
chooses its own output, qi, taking as given the outputs of all competing outlets (the
qjs, j Þ i). Thus, the ﬁrst-order condition for qi is:
a 2 b(o q 1 q) 2 bq 2 c 5 0. (4) jÞij i i
In equilibrium, all outlets of a given type are identical. Thus, they all choose the same
optimal output, so we set qi 5 qj 5 q* in Equation (4) and solve for q* to obtain:
q* 5 (a 2 c)/b(n 1 1), (5)
where we assume a . c. It follows from Equation (5) that aggregate output is:OPTIMAL COMPETITION AND ALLOCATION OF SPACE IN SHOPPING CENTERS 117
Q* 5 nq* 5 n(a 2 c)/b(n 1 1). (6)
Substituting Q* into the demand function in Equation (1) yields the equilibrium price:
P* 5 a 2 n(a 2 c)/(n 1 1). (7)
Finally, substituting q* and P* into Equation (2) yields per store and aggregate proﬁts,
respectively:
2 p* 5 (1/b)[(a 2 c)/(n 1 1)] , (8)
2 P [ np* 5 (n/b)[(a 2 c)/(n 1 1)] . (9)
The assumption that the developer extracts all economic proﬁts from tenant stores
implies that nR 5 P is the aggregate rents paid by the n competing outlets. It follows
from Equation (9) that this quantity is maximized at n 5 1. Speciﬁcally, differentiate
Equation (9) to obtain:
22 2 ­P/­n 5 [(a 2 c)/ b][(2n 1 1)/(n 1 1) ], (10)
which is negative for integer values of n greater than one. Thus, writing proﬁt as a
function of the number of outlets, n,w eh a v eP(1) . P(2) . ..., which leads to the
conclusion that, ignoring interstore externalities, the developer should allow entry of
only one outlet of a given type of store in order to maximize economic proﬁts.
Speciﬁcally, suppose initially that there is one store of type j but none of type k.I f
the developer adds a new store, the joint proﬁt from the two stores will necessarily
be larger if he adds a store of type k rather than a second outlet of type j since:
P(1) 1 P (1) . P(2). (11) jkj
Thus, it never pays to duplicate stores.7
Now consider the impact of external beneﬁts conferred by a store of type j on other
stores in the shopping center. As noted above, these external beneﬁts arise when
customers of this store spill over into other stores (i.e., stores selling complementary
products), thereby enhancing their sales. Thus, the external beneﬁts are increasing in
the aggregate output (or ‘‘trafﬁc’’) of the type j outlets. To capture this more Q*, j
formally, we write the aggregate external beneﬁts conferred by type j stores on all
other (non-identical) stores in the general form Ej where . 0.8 (This (Q*), E9 jj
speciﬁcation is sufﬁcient to demonstrate the desired result; in the next section, we
derive E more rigorously beginning with the demand functions of each store.) It
follows from Equation (6) that:
2 ­E /­n 5 E9z[(a 2 c)/b(n 1 1) ] . 0. (12) jj jj j j j
That is, the external beneﬁts generated by type j stores are increasing in the number
of outlets. Thus, if is large enough, it will be optimal for the developer to include E9 j
more than one outlet of store j.118 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 2
Categories for the Degree of Retail Compatibility
Category
Percentage of Customer Interchange
Nelson (1958) Eppli and Shilling (1993)
Highly compatible 10–20 .30
Moderately compatible 5–10 10–30
Slightly compatible 1–5 5–10
Incompatible 0 0
Deleterious ,0 ,0
Speciﬁcally, the developer will choose nj to maximize total revenue from type j stores,
which is given by the aggregate rents of these stores plus the spillover sales revenue,
or Pj(nj) 1 Ej(nj). The optimal nj thus solves the ﬁrst-order condition:
­P /­n 1 ­E /­n # 0. (13) jj jj
We showed that the ﬁrst term is negative for nj . 1. Thus, for it to be optimal to
include more than one outlet of type j, the second term, which captures the marginal
spillover beneﬁt, must be large enough to offset the decline in aggregate rents resulting
from competition by the additional j outlets. Ultimately, this is an empirical matter
that depends on the characteristics of individual stores.
Anikeeff (1996) surveys previous attempts to measure the degree of spillover
shopping, or ‘‘retail compatibility,’’ across different types of non-anchor stores. The
most systematic attempt, by Nelson (1958), classiﬁed stores into ﬁve categories
according to the percentage of customers who visit a given pair of stores. Exhibit 2
lists Nelson’s categories (column 1) and the percentages of customer ‘‘interchange’’
that deﬁne each (column 2). More recently, Eppli and Shilling (1993) used new data
and improved methods to re-estimate the degree of retail compatibility for a sample
of stores in ﬁfty-four regional shopping centers in the United States. Column 3 of
Exhibit 2 shows the percentages that they assigned to Nelson’s categories. Generally,
the percentages are higher, indicating greater compatibility. This result is probably
due in part to the change in methodology and in part to changes in shopping patterns.
Whatever the numbers, these studies reveal that careful selection of a shopping
center’s tenant mix is crucial in achieving maximum proﬁtability.
An Illustration: Filling a Vacant Store
The preceding theory suggests that the optimal number of stores of a given type in a
shopping center balances two offsetting effects. On the one hand, an additional outlet
of a given type results in lower aggregate rent due to greater competition, but on the
other, the resulting increase in trafﬁc ﬂow in the center raises the sales (and hence
proﬁts) of all other stores. In this section, we apply the insights from this theory to
examine a problem that landlords routinely face, namely, how to ﬁll a vacancy in theOPTIMAL COMPETITION AND ALLOCATION OF SPACE IN SHOPPING CENTERS 119
center. In particular, we ask whether the landlord should add an additional outlet of
a store that is already present in the center (a competing store) or a new type of store.
Suppose that there is a single vacancy in the center which the landlord can ﬁll with
one of two potential tenants, A or B. Further, suppose that there already exists an
outlet of type A in the center, but there is no outlet of type B. Thus, if A is chosen,
it would compete with the existing store, thereby lowering net sales revenue and hence
rents. Trafﬁc throughout the center, however, would be higher, thereby leading to
greater sales (and rents) in non-competing stores. If instead B is chosen, it would
operate as a monopoly, generating higher net sales revenue compared to store A,b u t
less trafﬁc (all else equal). The landlord’s choice between these two options depends
on a comparison of these offsetting effects.
To be more speciﬁc, suppose that if the landlord chooses store A, the yearly proﬁt
from the center as a whole would be:
P (2) 1 oP(A), (14) A
where the ﬁrst term is the combined proﬁts from the two competing type A stores,
and the second term is aggregate proﬁts for all other stores in the center (i.e., all
stores except the existing type A store and the new store). The fact that PA(2) ,
PA(1) reﬂects the lost proﬁts from competition, but oP(A) captures the increased sales
in all other stores due to greater trafﬁc.9
In contrast, if the landlord chooses the type B store, aggregate proﬁts would be:
P (1) 1 P (1) 1 oP(B), (15) AB
where the ﬁrst term is the proﬁt from the existing type A store, the second term is
the proﬁt from the new type B store, both operating as monopolists, and the third
term is the aggregate proﬁts from all other stores when the vacancy is ﬁlled with a
type B store. The net yearly gain in proﬁts from adding a type A store rather than a
type B store is therefore given by the difference between Equations (14) and (15), or
by:
D 5 [P (2) 2 P (1) 2 P (1)] 1 [oP(A) 2 oP(B)]. (16) AAB
Note that the ﬁrst term in square brackets is negative by Equation (11), indicating
that, in the absence of interstore externalities, it is always better to have two different
types of stores acting as monopolists than to have two stores of the same type
competing against one another. The second bracketed term captures the externality,
or spillover effect of the new store on the aggregate rents of all other stores. In order
for store A to be chosen, the additional revenue from greater trafﬁc generated by
competition between the two type A stores must be larger than the additional revenue
from trafﬁc generated by individual stores of type A and B, each acting as a monopolist
(i.e., oP(A) 2 oP(B) must be positive), and this effect must be enough to offset the
ﬁrst term so that D . 0. (Note that the positivity of oP(A) 2 oP(B) does not imply120 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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that store B confers no external beneﬁts on other stores; it merely says that these
beneﬁts are less than those conferred by a second store A.)
To illustrate the preceding analysis, consider the following numerical example.
Suppose that the developer of a shopping center has one vacant store containing 2,500
square feet (s.f.) of leasable area, and there are two tenants interested in the space: a
book store (A) and a toy store (B). Suppose that there is already a 3,000 s.f. book
store in the center but no toy store.
The developer has the results of a research study estimating the increased trafﬁc ﬂow
from various types of stores. It shows that the second book store would increase trafﬁc
by an average of 15 people/day, and the toy store would increase trafﬁc by 8
people/day. The study also indicates that each spillover customer on average spends
$50 elsewhere in the center. Finally, the study projects that the book store’s net sales
would be $240 per s.f. per year but it would reduce the existing book store’s proﬁts
by 20%, whereas the toy store’s net sales would be $195 per s.f. per year. Net sales
at the existing book store prior to ﬁlling the vacancy are $260 per s.f. per year.10
Given this information, if the book store is added, the combined proﬁts from the two
book stores would be:
($240/s.f. * 2,500 s.f.) 1 [($260/s.f. * 3,000 s.f.)(1 2 .2)] 5 $1,224,000,
and the aggregate gain in proﬁts to all other stores would be (15 people/day * 365 *
$50/person) 5 $273,750. Given Equation (13), the increase in proﬁts from the center
as a whole would be $1,224,000 1 $273,750 5 $1,497,750.
If instead the landlord chose the toy store, the existing book store would earn proﬁts
of ($260/s.f. * 3,000 s.f.) 5 $780,000, the new toy store would earn proﬁts of
($195/s.f. * 2,500 s.f.) 5 $487,500, and all other stores in the center would earn
additional proﬁts of (8 people/day * $50/person * 365) 5 $146,000. Thus, the overall
gain in proﬁts would be $780,000 1 $487,500 1 $146,000 5 $1,413,500. The yearly
net gain from the book store as compared to the toy store is therefore $1,497,750 2
$1,413,500 5 $84,250, making the book store the preferred choice.
Of course, this outcome depends on the particular numbers in the example. Exhibits
3–5 therefore examine the sensitivity of the results to changes in three key parameters:
the percentage loss in business to the existing book store from the new book store
(Exhibit 3), the trafﬁc generated by the two stores (Exhibit 4) and the average spending
per day by spillover customers (Exhibit 5). (This example is indicated in each
illustration by the dashed lines.) Exhibit 3 shows that, as the new book store causes
a greater loss in proﬁts to the existing book store (all else equal), adding another book
store becomes less desirable. Exhibit 4 shows the impact of varying the trafﬁc
generated by the stores. The fact that the curves are upward sloping indicates that an
increase in trafﬁc from either store increases aggregate proﬁts to the center. The curve
for the toy store is everywhere above that of the book store, reﬂecting the competitive
loss to the existing book store. Nevertheless, the book store is still preferred if theOPTIMAL COMPETITION AND ALLOCATION OF SPACE IN SHOPPING CENTERS 121
Exhibit 3
Effects of Varying Competitive Loss from Additional Store
Exhibit 4
Effects of Changes in Additional Trafﬁc
combined book stores generate enough additional trafﬁc (as is the case in the above
example). Finally, Exhibit 5 shows the effect of varying the amount of spending by
spillover customers. It shows that gross proﬁts are increasing in customer spending,
though at different rates for the two stores. Thus, as spending increases, a switch point
from the toy store to the book store occurs at the intersection of the two curves.
Integrating Output and Space in the Model
The theoretical analysis in the previous section focused on competition and
complementarity across stores in their choices of output, holding ﬁxed the amount of122 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 5
Effects of Varying Average Customer Spending
space per store. As noted in the introduction, however, this focus on output is in
contrast to Brueckner’s (1993) original theoretical treatment of the shopping
externality, which modeled the externality solely as a function of the amount of space
allocated to different stores. Speciﬁcally, Brueckner speciﬁed a net sales function for
each store i that depended on the space allocated to each of the m types of stores in
the center (assuming one outlet of each type):
R 5 R(S ,S , ..., S ). (17) ii 12 m
Brueckner assumed that sales were increasing in a store’s own-space and non-
decreasing in the space allocated to all other types of stores. That is,
­R /­S . 0, ­R /­S $ 0, i 5 1, ..., m, j Þ 1, (18) ii ij
where the cross-store effects, ­Ri/­Sj $ 0, captured the shopping externality.
In this section, we extend the model from the previous section to include both output
and space. Our objective in doing this is to derive Brueckner’s sales function in
Equation (18) from proﬁt maximization by individual stores based on an underlying
demand function that includes cross-store output effects and own-space effects.
Speciﬁcally, we write the inverse demand function in Equation (1) for a type i store
more explicitly as:
P 5 aS 1 o b Q 2 bQ, (19) ii ij Þijj ii
where Si is the ﬂoor space allocated to store i, and Qj is the aggregate output of stores
of type j, j Þ i. Thus, as above, the price and output of a given type of store are
inversely related, as indicated by the term 2biQi. In addition, price is assumed to be
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ojÞibjQj), and positively related to the space allocated to store i (the term aiSi). (Note
that the parameter a in Equation (1) is comprised of the ﬁrst two terms on the right-
hand side of Equation (19); that is, ai 5 aiSi 1 ojÞibjQj.)11
The inclusion of a store’s own space as a positive shift factor in Equation (19)
presumably reﬂects the fact that a larger store will accommodate more customers at
a given point in time, thereby shifting out the store’s demand curve.12 There seems
no reason to believe, however, that increasing the space of other stores will directly
affect store i’s demand curve, so the Sjs are not included in Equation (19). However,
as we shall show, the Sjs will enter store i’s sales function indirectly through the Qjs,
which will result in a net sales function for store i that depends on the space allocated
to each store. In order to simplify the analysis in this section, we will assume (in
contrast to the previous section) that there is only one store of each type acting as a
monopolist.13 In addition, we will assume below that there are only two types of
stores (i.e., m 5 2). This will be sufﬁcient to illustrate the results while keeping the
model tractable.
We assume, as in the previous section, that each store maximizes its proﬁt by choosing
its output, Q, taking as given the output of other stores, the amount of space allocated
to it in the center, and the rent for that space. Thus, each store treats the ﬁrst two
terms on the right-hand side of Equation (19) as parameters.14 As a result, the optimal
output and net sales revenue for each store are given by Equations (6) and (9),
respectively, with ni 5 1 and ai 5 aiSi 1 ojÞibjQj. Note, however, that these are not
reduced form expressions, given that ai depends on the Qjs through the demand curve
in Equation (19). In other words, the Qis must be determined simultaneously in
equilibrium given the cross-store effects.
In order to illustrate such a solution, we consider the case where m 5 2; that is, where
there are only two stores in the center. In that case, we have from (6):
Q 5 (a 2 c )/2b , (20) 11 1 1
Q 5 (a 2 c )/2b , (21) 22 2 2
where
a 5 a S 1 b Q , (22) 11 12 2
a 5 a S 1 b Q , (23) 22 21 1
Substituting Equation (22) into Equations (20) and (23) into Equation (19) and solving
simultaneously yields:
Q*(S ,S ) 5 (2a b /V)S 1 (ba/V)S 2 (2bc 1 b c )/V, (24) 11 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
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Q*(S ,S ) 5 (ba/V)S 1 (2a b /V)S 2 (2bc 1 b c )/V, (25) 21 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
where V 5 4b1b2 2 b1b2, which is positive assuming bi . bi (i.e., own-quantity
effects are greater than cross effects). Equations (24) and (25) represent the
equilibrium outputs of the two stores as a function of their allocations of space.
Differentiating Equations (24) and (25) immediately implies that /­Si . 0 and ­Q* i
/­Sj . 0 for i, j 5 1, 2. That is, equilibrium output for both stores is increasing ­Q* i
in the space allocated to each store.
Net sales for store i for the case where ni 5 1 are given by Equation (9):
2 P 5 (a 2 c)/ 4 b , i 5 1, 2. (26) ii i i
Substituting for ai using (S1,S2) yields: Q* i
2 P(S ,S ) 5 [aS 1 bQ(S ,S ) 2 c]/ 4 b , i 5 1, 2. (27) i 12 ii i i 12 ii
Note that this expression corresponds to Brueckner’s net sales function Ri(S1,S2)i n
that it gives store i’s net sales solely as a function of the space allocated to the two
stores. It follows from Equations (27), (24) and (25) that:
­P /­S . 0 and ­P /­S . 0, i 5 1, 2 (28) i 1 i 2
Thus, net sales are increasing in the space allocated to both stores as conjectured in
Equation (18).
Given Equations (27) and (28), the problem for the developer is to choose S1 and S2
(for the case of m 5 2) to maximize aggregate proﬁts (or rents) for the two stores
less the cost of space, denoted K(S1 1 S2). The ﬁrst order conditions for S1 and S2
are given by
­P /­S 1 ­P /­S 2 K9(S 1 S ) 5 0, i 5 1, 2, (29) 1 i 2 i 12
where ­Pi/­Si captures the marginal beneﬁt of a store’s own allocation of space, the
cross derivatives ­Pi/­Sj (i Þ j) capture the external shopping effects as a function
of space, and K9(S1 1 S2) is the marginal cost of space. This condition says that space
should be allocated to a given store up to the point where its marginal sales are equal
to the marginal cost of space minus the incremental sales that this store generates for
all other stores in the center. Thus, more space should be allocated to those stores
that confer greater sales beneﬁts on other stores, all else equal. Again, this is an
empirical matter as discussed earlier. The developer fully internalizes these external
effects, and therefore makes the optimal allocation of space, given our assumption
that the proﬁts of all stores can be extracted in the form of rents.15
Conclusion
This article represents a ﬁrst effort to integrate the output choice of stores and the
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Inclusion of output sharpened the model in two ways. First, it provided a more natural
way to examine the trade-off between competition and complementarity in the choice
of tenant mix by a proﬁt maximizing developer. Second, it allowed us to derive
Brueckner’s fundamental sales function, which he speciﬁed solely as a function space,
from proﬁt maximizing behavior by individual stores in the presence of inter-store
shopping externalities.
Despite these contributions to the theory, our understanding of the economics of
shopping center design is far from complete. This fact, and the increasing importance
of shopping centers in the urban landscape, suggests that further research on this topic
is warranted.
Notes
1 Also see Benjamin, Boyle and Sirmans (1992), Eppli and Shilling (1993, 1995), Miceli and
Sirmans (1995) and Anikeeff (1996). Eppli and Shilling (1993) refer to the shopping externality
as the ‘‘Rule of Retail Compatibility.’’ They provide empirical studies of its magnitude for
various combinations of stores.
2 In an extension, Brueckner also considered a store’s choice of ‘‘managerial effort.’’ In this
article, we do not address this issue or other sorts of agency problems that bear on the choice
of tenant mix. For a detailed analysis of these issues, see Miceli and Sirmans (1995).
3 Variety stores are therefore a small-scale version (and presumably the progenitor) of the
shopping center.
4 The speciﬁcation of demand in Equation (1) says that, from the perspective of consumers of
a given product, price and quantity are inversely related. That is, as the price increases
(decreases), the quantity that the store can sell will decrease (increase). Economists refer to this
inverse relationship between P and Q as the Law of Demand.
5 Thus, we follow Brueckner’s (1993) scenario of the developer as a perfectly discriminating
monopolist.
6 Since Brueckner (1993) does not explicitly include output in his model, the only cost stores
incur in his model is rent, or the cost for space. Thus, his sales function R [see Equation (17)]
corresponds to net sales, or p, in our model.
7 Note that this is true even if the two j stores make more gross proﬁt than the single k store;
that is, even if Pj (2) . Pk(1).
8 This assumes that the trafﬁc through store j is proportional (or at least positively related) to
its aggregate output.
9 Thus, oP(A) would be a function of the degree of retail compatibility between store A and
each of the other stores in the center.
10 Sales ﬁgures are based on median sales data for different types of tenants from Dollars and
Cents of Shopping Centers, 1995.
11 For notational simplicity, we do not include an additional constant term in Equation (18).
12 The fact that more own-space shifts out a store’s demand curve is implicit in Brueckner
(1993:9).
13 Thus, qi 5 Qi for all i 5 1,...,m.
14 This again reﬂects Cournot-Nash conjectures, as well as the assumption that the developer
dictates a store’s allocation of space and its rent. This latter assumption may be unrealistic for
the case of large anchor tenants who presumably bargain with the developer for space and rent.
15 Thus, like a perfectly discriminating monopolist, the developer makes the socially efﬁcient
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